College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

1972

The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the
General Issue of Civil Liberty
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School

Repository Citation
Van Alstyne, William W., "The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty" (1972). Faculty
Publications. 792.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/792

Copyright c 1972 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

The SpecificTheoryof AcademicFreedomand the
GeneralIssue of Civil Liberties*
By WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE t

ABSTRACT:Academic freedom has been blurred in law and

in popular usage. Its clarificationshould enable the Supreme
Court to grant it explicit protection under the Constitution
as an identifiable subset of First Amendment freedoms. Its
identification with the professional endeavors of faculty members, moreover, should reduce the tendency of institutions to
intrude upon the aprofessionalpersonal liberties of the faculty
even while adequately protecting the extramural professional
pursuits of the faculty and assuringthem of equal protection in
their interests as private citizens. Adjustments of standards
by the American Association of University Professors, more
definitely distinguishing the special accountability of faculty
membersfor the integrity of their professional endeavors from
their roles as private citizens, is long overdue.
William Van Alstyne is Professor of Law at Duke University. He is past General
Counsel of the American Association of University Professors and currently serves
as Chairman of Committee A on academic freedom and tenure.
* This article is the revised product of a manuscript presented in the course of a symposium
on academic freedom in the spring of 1972 at the University of Texas, under a grant from
the Council of Learned Societies. The author is especially grateful to Professor Edmund
Pincoffs for his support and encouragement and to the several participants whose comments
provided the basis for certain revisions. It is not possible accurately to credit the various
sources that have helped to inform this essay, especially those that did so indirectly, that is,
in espousing quite different views of academic freedom than those offered here. Most especially helpful in thinking about the subject, however, were the many Committee A Case
Reports scattered throughout the volumes of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) Bulletin, the brief essay by Arthur Lovejoy in Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences (1937), s.v. "academic freedom," the splendid volume by Richard Hofstadter and

WalterMetzger,The Developmentof AcademicFreedomin the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), and Fritz Machlup's trenchant address, "On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom," AAUP Bulletin 41 (1955), p. 753. There were several
other very helpful materials too numerous to mention here.
t Because portions of this essay bear directly on certain standards of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), it is of more than customary importance to stress
that my statement of views is wholly personal.
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AHALF-CENTURY
ago, the Constitution was misconstruedto provide no positive law support for John
Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty. Insofar as the free exercise of political liberty was tied to a job, neither professors nor policemen could safely pursue
their civil liberties without anxiety that
they would be fired. The utter insecurity of liberty and status, even
against abridgments by government
itself, was underscored by the laconic
dictum of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
in 1892:
The petitionermay have a constitutional
right to talk politics,but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman ....
There are few employmentsfor hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspendhis constitutionalrightof free speech,
as well as of idleness,by the impliedterms
of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employmenton the
termswhichare offeredhim.1
The point was not lost on the academic
profession in the dismal outcome of the
Scopes Monkey trial, in 1927:
[Scopes] had no right or privilegeto serve
the state except upon such terms as the
state prescribed. ...

In dealing with its

own employeesengageduponits ownwork,
the state is not hamperedby the limitations of ...

the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitutionof the United States.2
AN OVERVIEW

It was exactly during this same period that American professors, familiar
with the tradition and values of Lehrfreiheit in German universities, began
to domesticate it and to propound the
concept of "academic freedom" as a
principle worthy of general respect to
fill up the void of the positive law in
this country. Given the circumstances
1. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892).
2. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111-12,
289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927).
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-given the surprising success of the
infant American Association of University Professors (AAUP), founded in
1915 and at once startled by the extent
to which its good offices were sought
by aggrieved faculty members-it is
not remarkablethat an ineluctable tendency developed to expand upon academic freedom to make it perform a
larger service. From the solid and
fortified arguments sustaining academic
freedomas a logical imperative if academicians were to fulfill the cardinal expectation laid upon their professional
employment, the principle was pressed
into the larger field of civil liberties
whether or not such liberties were professionally linked. In the absence of
other sources of employment security
protecting professors from dismissal in
pursuing conventional political activities
off-the-job and on their own time, or
entering into ordinary public assemblies
and taking personal positions on social
issues simply as private citizens and not
as professional scholars or researchers,
academic freedom offered itself as an
irresistibly attractive umbrella. Gradually, the phrase slipped away from a
close association with protection of the
academic in his professional endeavors
and assumed a new synonymy with the
general civil liberties of academicsand especially their general political
liberties. Accordingly, the protection
of an academic in respect to the exercise
of his aprofessional political liberties
was argued into position as a subset of
academic freedom. The effort so far
succeeded that it has long been routine
for AAUP Committee A Reports to describe the dismissal of professors on account of aprofessional political activity
as a violation of their "academic freedom." Professor Fritz Machlup accurately reports the situation in the new
Encyclopaedia of Higher Education:
"Academic freedom (in its modem conception, though not in the past) in-
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cludes the right of the academic individual to engage in political activity." 3

characterand function of the university
scholar.4

The obvious point is that others who
Damaging to the profession
work for a living may also wish to afIt is the seemingly small and reac- filiate with
unpopularcauses or to speak
tionary purpose of this essay to suggest
about political issues of the day
freely
that this development in the usage of
without reference to their regular work
academic freedom was never sound and
that it ought now to be abandoned. or professional endeavors, sometimes,
Far from continuing to be helpful to as in our own case, even in sharp opthe profession, moreover, I believe the position to the known wishes of the
continued use of the phrase in this institutional employer. Manifestly, it
expanded sense is damaging to the must-and does-strike them as odd
that professors nevertheless insist on
profession in three important ways.
an extra right to be protected
indiscrimof
the
having
ubiquitousness
First,
inate claims to academic freedom, in in these aprofessional pursuits and to
respect to aprofessional political activ- do such things-a claim which is subity, provides substance to a widespread limely stronger than their own. Probelief that the professoriat sees itself as fessors insist that such activities are
an extraordinaryelite, since we tend to part of their academic freedom and a
associate our claim to protection not special contribution to the social good;
with the general case for civil liberties, whereas such activities by others are
but rather as a special case or subset merely an ordinary matter of common
of academic freedom. As implied in the liberty to be tolerated in a liberal sofollowing observation by Glenn Morrow ciety but not, of course, of the same
in his effort to rationalize the de- rank of special social good as the
fense of academic freedom, the sprawl- protection of academic freedom.
The consequent tendency of class
ing claim seems, without reason, to
the
to
indifferent
be
indistinguishable cleavage and cost in good will that I
wish to emphasize, however, is not
citizens:
other
of
predicament
the apparent and suspect elitism
The justificationof academic freedom simply
our
of
claim; for if the claim were well
cannot be based merely on the right to
freedom of thought and expression en- taken, it would be a sufficient answer
that we must simply try harder to perjoyed by all citizens of a liberal society,
for academicfreedomimpliesimmunityto suade a larger public that it is indeed
some naturalconsequencesof free speech a correct one. Rather, the price we
that the ordinarycitizen does not enjoy. pay is the much greater cost of the lad
An ordinary citizen who expresses un- who cried "wolf" so often when it was
popular opinions may lose customers if false that few would pay attention when
he is a merchant,clientsif he is a lawyer, it was true: an errant claim of academic
patients if he is a physician,advertisers freedom obscures the vital importance
or subscribersif he is the editorof a news- of academic freedom as more
modestly
paper, or suffer other forms of social or conceived and
thereby engenders public
economic penalty resulting from disapindifference even when an authentic
proval of his expressed opinion....
The justification of academic freedom issue of academic freedom is clearly and
must thereforebe sought in the peculiar unmistakably involved. I mean to
3. Fritz Machlup,"AcademicFreedom," 4. Glenn Morrow, "Academic Freedom,"
Encyclopaedia of Higher Education (1972),

vol. 1, pp. 6, 8.

Encyclopaediaof Social Sciences (1968), vol.
1, pp. 4, 6.
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argue, of course, that while a professor's ordinary freedom of speech is not
a subset of his academic freedom, academic freedom is itself a special subset of First Amendment freedoms. Its
importance as a special subset is likely
to be obscured and ignored, however,
if we ourselves do not hold to the
distinction.
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to academic freedom, however, in spite
of the fact that the Court has often
made highly honorable mention of the
phrase in the adjudication of First
Amendment claims.6 The prolonged

* 6. The Supreme Court has often adverted
to academic freedom in dicta. See, for example, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967): "Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us
constitutional
status
Postponed
and not merely to the teachers concerned.
Second, although I cannot prove the That freedom is therefore a special concern of
correctness of the impression, I believe the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
that the earlier and errant expansion of laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom"; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
academic freedom claims beyond the U.S.
479 (1965): "[T]he State may not, conboundaries of its core rationale has in- sistently with the spirit of the First Amendadvertently delayed the specific assimi- ment, contract the spectrum of available
lation of academic freedom into consti- knowledge. The right of freedom of speech
and
not only the right to utter
tutional law. In 1958, the Supreme or topress includes
print, but the right to distribute, the
Court interpreted the First Amendment right to receive, the right to read . . . and
in a manner to provide separate and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and
distinct protection for freedom of asso- freedom to teach . . .-indeed the freedom of
the entire
community"; Barenblatt
ciation, deriving the sense and sub- v. United university
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959):
three
other
from
freedom
stance of that
"When academic teaching-freedom and its
clauses-those dealing with freedom of corollary learning-freedom, so essential to the
speech, freedom of assembly, and the well-being of the Nation, are claimed this
Court will
be on the alert against
right to petition for redress of griev- intrusion by always
Congress into this constitutionances-but nevertheless marking it with ally protected domain"; Sweezy v. New
a character of its own with certain Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51, 261-64
instrumental features different from (1957): "The essentiality of freedom in the
community of American universities is almost
those of its parent clauses.5 Nothing self-evident.
No one should underestimate
equivalent has yet developed in respect the vital role in a democracy that is played
by those who guide and train our youth. To
5. See M. W. Solter, "Freedomof Associa- impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
tion-A New and FundamentalCivil Right," leaders in our colleges and universities would
George WashingtonLaw Review 27 (1959), imperil the future of our Nation. .
p. 653; T. Emerson,"Freedomof Association Teachers and students must always remain
and Freedomof Expression,"Yale Law Jour- free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
nal 74 (1964), p. 1. The initial case was gain new maturity and understanding; otherN.A.A.C.P.v. Alabama,357 U.S. 449 (1958), wise our civilization will stagnate and die.
which on its face required but the slightest . . . We do not now conceive of any cirextension of free speech and assembly prece- cumstance wherein a state interest would
dents. By the time additionalcases involving justify infringement of rights in this field";
quite different interests had been decided, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-98
clearly it had become more useful and accu- (1952): "By limiting the power of the States
rate to speak of a distinctive freedom of to interfere with freedom of speech and
association. See, for example, N.A.A.C.P. v. freedom of inquiry and freedom of associaButton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. tion, the Fourteenth Amendment protects all
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, persons, no matter what their calling. But, in
372 U.S. 529 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. view of the nature of the teacher's relation
Trainmenv. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 to the effective exercise of the rights which
are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by
(1964).
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gestation of academic freedom as an readily derived from, but not simply
identifiable First Amendment claim, a fungible with, freedom of speech docspecial subset of vocational freedoms trine or general First Amendment doctrine in respect to public employees,
the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of
may ironically be the consequence of
freedom of thought, and of action upon
our own previous tendencies to blur the
the
of
teachers
in
the
case
brings
thought,
distinctions. In possession of a perinto
of
amendments
those
vividly
safeguards
suasive justification in defense of acaoperation. . . . They must have the freedom
of responsible inquiry, by thought and acdemic freedom, and finding the general
tion, into the meaning of social and economic
of other civil liberties so
protection
of
social and
ideas, into the checked history
hopelessly inadequate in respect to the
economic dogma. They must be free to sift
evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and security of employment and the exercircumstance, from that restless, enduring cise of free speech in general, we too
process of extending the bounds of underexpediently extended the rhetoricof acastanding and wisdom, to assure which the
demic freedom to press for additional
freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of
degrees of protection which other kinds
worship are guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States against infraction by
of employees were denied at the time.
National or State government. The functions
The cost of the inaccuracy, however,
of educational institutions in our national life
has
been the indefinite postponement of
and the conditions under which alone they
can adequately perform them are at the basis constitutional status for academic freeof these limitations upon State and National
dom as a separate, albeit limited,
power"; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
First Amendment right. The chances
(1960): "The vigilant protection of constitufor the specific constitutional protection
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools"; Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59-60 (1967):
"We are in the First Amendment field. The
continuing surveillance which this type of
law places on teachers is hostile to academic
freedom."
Additionally, a number of writers have
previously urged the judiciary to acknowledge
a separately identifiable First Amendment
right to academic freedom. See, for example,
W. Murphy, "Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right," Law and Contemporary Problems 28 (1963), p. 447; T.
Emerson and D. Haber, "Academic Freedom
of the Faculty Member as Citizen," ibid., p.
525; David Fellman, "Academic Freedom in
American Law," Wisconsin Law Review 1961
(1961), p. 3; W. Van Alstyne, "The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors," Duke Law Journal (1970), p. 841.
Nevertheless, it is clear that closure between
the First Amendment and a distinct right of
academic freedom has not yet been made.
The current situation is summed up in Justice
Holmes' observation about the work of a
colleague: "I used to say that he had a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got
nearer than two inches to each other."
[Quoted in E. J. Bander, ed., Justice Holmes,
Ex Cathedra (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie,
1966), p. 235.]

The lack of closure is illustrated by Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 397 (1968), invalidating a state criminal statute prohibiting
public school teachers from adverting to any
theory regarding the origin of man not consistent with the Bible. Despite the Court's
many previous references to academic freedom, Mr. Justice Black saw no substantive
difficulty with the statute and concurred in
the result solely because he thought the
statute to be impermissibly vague, that is, as
a criminal statute it provided insufficient
notice of the exact conduct teachers were
expected to avoid. [See also his dissenting
in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503, 521-22 (1969).] While disagreeing
that this was the sole fault of the statute,
Mr. Justice Steward suggested only that the
statute raised a substantial question in light
of "guarantees of free communication contained in the First Amendment," that is, a
general free speech issue without any more
specialized features peculiar to academic freedom. The Opinion for the Court went no
further, moreover, than to hold the statute
invalid as a violation of the religious estabone to wonder
lishment clause-leaving
whether the case has any significance at all
beyond the religion-related novelty of the
particular kind of statute involved in the case.
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of academic freedoms, as a subset of
First Amendment rights, would very
likely be improved if we ourselves had
managed to respect the difference.
Third, there is a marvelous irony in
the fact that the condition of constitutional law has not remained static since
the policeman's case of 1892, or the
Scopes case of 1927. Rather, the extent of positive law protection of public
employees in general now extends fully
to threats against their employment in
retaliation for the exercise of freedom
of speech, and not merely to threats of
fines or jail. The point was again
made by the Supreme Court during
this most recent term, clearly reiterating
that even simple nonrenewal of an untenured faculty member by a public
institution would violate the First
Amendment if it was premised upon
personal political activity otherwise
protected by that amendment:
The first questionpresentedis whether
the respondent'slack of a contractualor
tenure right to re-employment, taken
alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewalof his contractviolated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold
that it does not.7
Even more, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a teacher would be so
greatly inhibited vis-a-vis other citizens
were he constrained by a strict professional standard of care, accuracy, and
courtesy in the rough-and-tumble of
ordinary political discussion that the
First Amendment will protect his employment from jeopardy where his departure from that standard related only
to his aprofessional political utterances
as a citizen, and not to his teaching,
research, professional publication, or to
similar institutional responsibilities of
7. Perry v. Sindermann, US. Law Week 40
(1972), pp. 5087, 5088. See also W. Van
Alstyne, "The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law," Harvard
Law Review 81 (1968), p. 1439.
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a professional character.8 Not only has
the practical reason which provided the
incentive-if not a compelling logicfor the earlier view that an academic's
civil liberties are a specific subset of
his academic freedom been largely removed,9 therefore, but the continued
insistence upon that view may even
work against the equal protection of
professors as citizens. In having rested
the right of the academic to pursue
ordinary political activity specifically as
a manifestation of his academic freedom, we have invited institutional employers to interest themselves in the
"professionalism" which the academic
employee reflects in that activity. The
wooden insistence that academic freedom is at the heart of an academic's
right to engage in political activity has
repeatedly drawn the sharp riposte that,
given this rationale, the political liberties of academics must be correspondingly reviewed by a higher standard8. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968), and see discussion in text at
n. 16 p. 153, of this article.
9. "Largely" is used advisedly in acknowledgment of the fact that neither the Bill of
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment is
applicable to institutions uninvolved with
government. For a consideration of this
issue, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v.
Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1121 (2d
Cir. 1970); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d
Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Brown, 392 F.2d
120 (3rd Cir. 1968), aff'g 270 F. Supp. 782
(E.D. Pa. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921
(1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
University, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Greene v. Howard University, 271 F. Supp.
609 (D.D.C. 1967), dismissed as moot, 412
F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Guillory v. Administration of Tulane University, 203 F.
Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp.
554, aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962). See
also R. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Public Law," Buffalo Law Review 19 (1970), p.
155; R. Schubert, "State Action and the Private University," Rutgers Law Review 24
(1970), p. 323.
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that is, a professional standard-than
the like activities of others It thus presumes to make professors subject to a
greater degree of overall employment
accountability than others generally
owe in respect to their private freedom,
virtually as an elitist's concession of
noblesse oblige given in exchange for
the special academic freedom claim:
that the claim of general civil liberty
by academics is more important to society than the claim of general civil
liberty of others. The instances in
which educational institutions have
acted on this concession are legion, as
many of the published Committee A
reports attest. Respectfully, I do not
think we can avoid some shared responsibility for this unhappy tendency,
given our past practice of claiming so
much for academic freedom and so little
for civil liberty. We may hope to get
out of this thicket more swiftly, however, by returning to the fundamentals
of academic freedom and simultaneously insisting upon the uniform and
robust protection of civil liberties.
The proposition that academic freedom is a special subset of First Amendment freedoms, but that it is distinguishable from other civil liberties,
necessarily means that it is not uniformly available in defense of a teacher's or scholar's purely aprofessional
pursuits, including even some involving
his general freedom of speech. The
acknowledgment that this is so, however, is not meant to imply that we
lack a suitable forensic or constitutional
basis to secure these other liberties
from institutional or legislative abridgment, or that the AAUP should be less
vigilant than it has been in reporting
conditions in higher education inimical
to those liberties. Indeed, I mean to
argue that in certain important respects, exactly the converse is more
nearly true: that the special constraints
of academic freedom cannot be invoked
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to arrest that latitude of general free
speech and personal liberty teachers are
fully entitled to enjoy as citizens on
equal terms with all other citizens, free
from any intrusion of institutional or
legislative power associated solely with
their academic and job-related responsibilities. The legitimate claims of personal autonomy possessed equally by
all persons, wholly without reference to
academic freedom, frame a distinct and
separate set of limitations upon the just
power of an institution to use its leverage of control. More than the profession may generally know (and far more
than an undifferentiatedtheory of academic freedom-with its excess baggage
of general responsibility-may itself
allow), moreover, the judicial recognition of these general limitations upon
institutional authority has already
taken hold. Part of this essay will attempt to make the case that the specific
theory of academic freedom is entirely
congenial to this welcome development
in constitutional law and that it may
contribute far more toward the equal
treatment of teachers and scholars in
the enjoyment of their personal liberties
than the less discriminating theory
which treats an academic's political
freedom as a subset of his academic
freedom.
THE DEFINITION, RATIONALE, AND
SYSTEM OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

The phrase "academic freedom," in
the context "the academic freedom of
a faculty member of an institution of
higher learning," refers to a set of vocational liberties: to teach, to investigate,
to do research, and to publish on any
subject as a matter of professional
interest, without vocational jeopardy or
threat of other sanction, save only upon
adequate demonstration of an inexcusable breach of professional ethics in
the exercise of any of them. Specifically, that which sets academic freedom
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apart as a distinct freedom is its vocational claim of special and limited
accountability in respect to all academically related pursuits of the teacherscholar: an accountability not to any
institutional or societal standard of
economic benefit, acceptable interest,
right thinking, or socially constructive
theory, but solely to a fiduciary standard of professional integrity. To condition the employment or personal freedom of the teacher-scholar upon the
institutional or societal approval of his
academic investigations or utterances,
or to qualify either even by the immediate impact of his professional endeavors upon the economic well-being
or good will of the very institution
which employs him, is to abridge his
academic freedom. The maintenance
of academic freedom contemplates an
accountability in respect to academic
investigations and utterances solely in
respect of their professional integrity,
a matter usually determined by reference to professionalethical standards of
truthful disclosure and reasonable care.
Academic freedom is a "freedom"rather than a "right"-in the sense that
it establishes an immunity from the
power of others to use their authority
to restrain its exercise without, however, necessarily commandinga right of
institutional subsidy for every object
of professional endeavor that might engage the interest of the individual professor. In cleaving to a limited program
or in husbanding its scarce financial
resources, for instance, the decision of
an institution not to offer a particular
subject or not, itself, to provide means
for a particular line of research may be
faulted as educationally unenlightened,
but it would not, on that account,
constitute an abridgment of academic
freedom. At the same time, however,
academic freedom would be abridged
were any form of sanction threatened
against a faculty member because of

AND CIVIL

LIBERTIES

147

any of his professional pursuits, even
assuming that the individual's interest
pertained to a subject that the institution declines itself to support and may
thoroughly disapprove. A principle of
educational pluralism may excuse an
act of institutional parochialismin what
it is prepared to offer as an institution
of higher learning, but the principle of
academic freedom clearly condemns any
act of institutional censure in respect
to the professional endeavors of its
faculty, assuming only no failing of
professional integrity in the pursuit of
those endeavors. Similarly, academic
freedom protects the vocational discretion of faculty members to conduct
whatever instruction and research they
may be retained to provide consistent
with standards of professional integrity.
Three cases
We may concretely illustrate the several foregoing observations by briefly
stating three cases, all of which lie
easily within the uniform protection of
academic freedom:
Case 1. A faculty member is assigned to teach a course in biology inclusive of theories respecting the origin
of man. A state law provides that a
teacher may be fired and fined if he
adverts to any theory of evolution or
point of view respecting the origin of
man inconsistent with the literal story
of Genesis. The law is an infringement
of the teacher's academic freedom insofar as it forecloses a professionally
responsible treatment of the subject.'0
Case 2. An English professor assigns
a particular short story to give her students a better understanding of one
genre of Western literature. Conceding
that the professor's ability and particular treatment of the subject are above
10. Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968), discussed in n. 6.
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reproach, the president of the college
nonetheless admonishes her to discontinue the assignment because in his
judgment the story is garbage, the philosophy of the story is destructive, and
because several parents have complained. Following her statement that
she believes she has a responsibility to
teach the story consistent with a professional treatment of the subject she
has been engaged to teach, she is fired.
Her dismissal clearly violated her academic freedom, assuming only that her
selection of the story was not otherwise a clearly inappropriate professional means of fulfilling her academic
responsibilities.11
Case 3. A professor of anthropology,
interested also in genetics, prepares a
paper which he presents before an offcampus symposium in which he reviews
the basis for a particular hypothesisthat significant evidence suggests the
inheritability of variable intelligence
linked to race. Although his utterances
are extramural, they are clearly academic in character. Assuming only
that he has been guilty of no failure
of professional integrity in the manner
in which he has presented his hypotheses, his conduct is fully protected by
fundamental principles of academic
freedom. Accordingly, no matter how
unpopular, distasteful, socially destructive, or embarrassing his extramural
presentation may seem to the university where he is employed, no action
may appropriately be taken against
him.12
The mechanismin common use in the
United States for the protection of aca11. Compare Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970), possibly the
first decision clearly identifying academic
freedom as a separate and distinct First
Amendment freedom.
12. The similarity of this hypothetical to
news accounts of Professor Arthur Jensen's
work is, of course, not accidental.
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demic freedom reflects the political and
institutional circumstances of the academic profession in this country. Were
teachers and scholars sole practitioners,
certified by licensure agencies in the
manner of doctors or lawyers, we might
expect that questions of professional
integrity would be reserved primarily
to these agencies-otherwise leaving
to individual clients or educational
"customers" the separate determination
of whether each teacher or scholar is
good enough in his profession to warrant being retained as an educational
mentor or as an independent contractor
to engage in research. There are no
such agencies in higher education as in
law and medicine, however, and one
will tend to starve as a sole practitioner.
Nor is today's academy at all like the
original Akademeia-simply a place on
the outskirts of Athens where Plato
could be found by anyone interested in
his professions. Neither are universities under the benign protection of
powerful autocrats, such as a German
prince or a powerful ecclesiastical organization which, while brooking no
academic freedom at all for criticism of
themselves or of the doctrines associated with their power, might otherwise
offer protection against the hostilities of
all others. Nor are entire faculties in
this country endowed as Oxford or
Cambridge with sufficient assets that
the faculties may largely control their
own situation.
Rather, it is all very familiar that
the academic profession is practiced in
this country in association with public
and private educational enterprises:
that one's capacity for the exercise of
academic freedom is inextricably tied
to his university employment, that the
ultimate financial resources of the institution are largely beyond the control
of the faculty, that ultimate managerial
responsibility is not lodged within the
faculty, and that issues of professional
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integrity are resolved not by licensure
or professional associations in the main,
but within each institution-at least in
the first instance. Insofar as public
institutions are concerned, the power
of the demos to force hemlock upon a
modern Socrates is constrained by the
Constitution-indeed, the power of the
people even to secure an end to his
academic freedom by having him fired
is thus constrained. In the development of a more general mechanism
within each institution for protecting
academic freedom, however, no satisfactory reason has been given to distinguish between the two kinds of academic institutions-public and private.
The fact that the Constitution makes
such a distinction for purposes of
positive law is largely beside the point.
In the absence of state, regional, or
national professional licensure agencies
composed of professional teachers and
scholars, the mechanism of professional
accountability common in the United
States has gradually developed through
the utilization of standing faculty committees within each institution in
which the professional teacher or
scholar is employed. Consistent with
what we have already said about academic freedom, however, the charge of
each such committee is strictly limited:
it is to ignore the particular impact of
any teacher's exercise of his academic
freedom upon the institution and to
concern itself solely with the question
of whether the teacher or scholar has
been guilty of such an inexcusable
breach of professional ethics as to warrant his termination, the penalty of
dismissal being appropriate only as a
necessary means of vindicating the very
functions which the system of academic
freedom is itself meant to serve.
For several reasons, largely related to
the practical necessity of using local
review committees, the judgment of
these standing committees is not final.
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Against the chance that the committee
members-themselves nearly always
drawn from within the institutionmay show undue favor from too close
an identification with a colleague, an
authority of limited review is recognized in the hierarchy of administration. Against the chance that the
committee members may show bias
against him-as from fear for their own
status, from a commitment to a given
professional dogma, or from professional envy or sheer personal dislikea more generous appeal may lie through
the hieararchy of administration and
thereafter to other bodies-like the
AAUP-and, on occasion at least, to
the courts. Indeed, the academic maverick may sometimes need more protection against the entrenched dogmas of
his immediate peers than against anyone else, thus necessitating some right
of appeal from a local judgment to the
judgment of others who have less
of a vested interest than they in the
maintenance of a given "truth."
This system does not always operate
to accomplish the end for which it is
designed, of course, as when a coincidence of prejudices-albeit often of
different kinds-may operate against
the faculty member at every level; but
superior alternatives are not readily
apparent. After all, no freedom, including even academic freedom, can
claim exemption from some degree of
accountability. Under current conditions of educational organization in
the United States, we have yet to discover a safer choice than to entrust
that accountability in respect to the
responsibilities of academicians in the
first instance to professionalpeer groups
within each institution, acting under the
specific constraint of confining their
review solely to an examination of the
professional integrity of the manner in
which the individual discharged his
professional responsibilities.
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Under more and less constraint
This system, developed specifically
for the maintenance of academic freedom, obviously differs from that which
generally prevails in ordinary employment relations. Significantly, however,
in respect to his academic freedom, the
teacher or scholar is simultaneously
under more constraint as well as under
less constraint than would ordinarily
obtain. Clearly he is under less constraint, of course, to the extent that
the standard is more protective of him
than if it were the standard common
to employment relationships in general;
that is, Did he perform his assignment
as directed by management, did he
avoid any indiscretions clearly forbidden by management, and has he otherwise conducted himself in a manner not
injurious to the economic well-being of
the enterprise? We have already noted
that none of these considerationsis permissible where the committee concludes
that the professions or conduct for
which the faculty member has been
called to account were otherwise within
the prerogative of his academic freedom. What is less obvious, however,
is the one respect in which the exercise
of academic freedom is also under considerably greater constraint than if the
conduct in which it is implicated were
governed only by ordinary standards of
accountability to one's employer: as
professional peers are admonished to be
less concerned than the administration
or trustees to consider any institutional
repercussions resulting from what a
given faculty member may have done
professionally wholly consistent with
the ethical use of his academic freedom, they are admonished to be far
more concerned than others in making
certain of that ethical use. The price
of an exceptional vocational freedom to
speak the truth as one sees it, without
penalty even for its possible immediate
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impact upon the economic well-being of
the employing institution, is the cost
of exceptional care in the representation of that "truth," a professional
standard of care. Indeed, a grave
ethical failure in the integrity of a
teacher's or scholar's academic representations, no matter of how little
notice or coincidental concern it may
happen to be to the particular institutional employer, is precisely the kind
of offense to the contingent privilege
of academic freedom which states a
clearly adequate cause for a faculty
recommendation of termination. The
very reason for specially protecting the
profession is itself frustrated, for instance, if experimental undertakings
are knowingly falsified, or positions of
professional responsibility are sought to
be gained through false representations
of originality-that is, plagiarism; it is
of no consequence that neither offense
may violate any general law, or that it
may turn out to be a matter of indifference to a particular board of trustees. In either case, the trust of
academic freedom has been violated
and strict accountability is in order.
In this way, then, academic freedom
speaks directly and distinctly to the
special critical role of the professional
teacher and scholar. He is encouraged
in the development of all of his academically related activities to ply a bold
and innovative critical acumen. On the
other hand, he is accountable to those
who share a like duty and a similar
commitment as his own, to answer at
a professional level for the ethical integrity of his work so to establish
by the fact of that integrity that he
fully justifies the contingent privilege of
academic freedomwhich he has claimed.
The distinction of academic freedom
from the general protection of free
speech is precisely located in its immediate and indissoluble nexus with
the cardinal social expectation laid
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upon the particular profession with
which it is identified-that there shall
be a vocation to examine received
learning and values critically, a vocation expected to do so and to make
itself useful by the fact of disseminating
its work. In this sense, it is the element of academic freedom which specifically identifies the profession: It is
simply contradictory to lay that expectation upon the profession and then to
prevent its accomplishment by deterring its fulfillment through rules which
punish its exercise. As Arthur Lovejoy,
who helped to found the AAUP, correctly observed:
It [that is, the social functionof academic
freedom] is rendered impossible if the
work of the investigatoris shackled by
the requirementthat his conclusionsshall
never seriously deviate either from generally acceptedbeliefs or from those accepted by the persons,private or official,
throughwhom society providesthe means
for the maintenanceof universities.13
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A SUBSET OF
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: A
COMPARISON WITH THE
GENERAL ISSUE OF
CIVIL LIBERTY

As an identifiable subset of First
Amendment freedoms, academic freedom requires a significant modification
in the standards of judicial review
otherwise applicable to freedom of
speech. Specifically, for instance, it
clearly ought not be enough in a given
case to uphold the discharge of a faculty member that the state may have
generally criminalized any use of pornography, or that the university may
have similarly presumed to forbid that
use, even assuming that the material is
not redeemedby standards the Supreme
Court has otherwise developed in deter13. Lovejoy, "Academic Freedom," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1930), vol. 1,
p. 384.
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mining whether sex-related material is
protected by the First Amendment.14
If it were true that even the hardestcore obscenity were being received,
read, and shared with immediate professionally involved colleagues in what
could be shown to be a professionally
responsible study of the subject, the
fact of the academic context is not irrelevant to a determination of the case
and may, indeed, be controlling. Professionally related efforts directed in
good faith precisely to fulfill the social
directive of the academic profession,
that is, to examine received learning
and values critically and to report the
results without fear of reprisal, will
make the case appropriate for the constitutional protection of academic freedom when the absence of these elements might otherwise spell its failure.
There is, of course, nothing in this
formulation that assumes that the First
Amendment subset of academic freedoms is a total absolute, any more than
freedom of speech is itself an exclusive
value prized literally above all else.
Thus, the false shouting of fire in a
crowded theater may not immunize a
professor of psychology from having to
answer for the consequences of the ensuing panic, even assuming that he did
it in order to observe crowd reaction
first-hand and solely to advance the
general enlightenment we may otherwise possess of how people act under
great and sudden stress. It is to observe, however, that the context of
academic setting provides an additional
constitutional consideration-the specific consideration of academic freedom-which may well be determinative
14. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).

152

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

under circumstanceswhere a free speech
claim would otherwise fail. Where
other societal values are not so clearly
conflicted by the particular manner in
which academic freedom is exercised
that the manner of that exercise can
reasonably be described as professionally reprehensible-as would assuredly
be true in the risking of human life in
the "controlled experiment" to determine how crowds react to panic-the
law or institutional rule which operates to abridge the exercise of that academic freedom should be held invalid
as applied to the particular case. In
this sense, then, it is proper to speak
specifically of academic freedoms as a
subset of First Amendment rights and
not to regard them as simply fungible
with freedom of speech in general.
Simultaneously, we are bound to acknowledge that when no claim of professional academic endeavor is present,
neither can one lever himself into a
preferred First Amendment position by
invoking a claim of academic freedom.
Granted that the proper characterization must sometimes be difficult and
even elusive, we must admit that not
all that a faculty member does in respect to his freedom of speech is a
manifestation of professional endeavor.
Indeed, a great deal of it is neither
professional nor unprofessional-that is,
done under professional auspices, but
in a clearly unprofessional manner.
Rather, it is simply aprofessional, and
the distinction is not a trivial one:
what is lost in respect to the special
protection of academic freedom may be
more than offset in a particular case by
a differentkind of gain-a gain in being
freed from the special accounltabilityof
academic freedom.
We have hesitated to acknowledge
the distinction between professional and
aprofessional activity, even when the
difference was abundantly clear, partly
from an understandable anxiety that

had we done so, that is, had we dispensed with the academic freedom claim,
we might then have been without a
place to stand in defending the faculty
member or in reproving the institution
that sought to dismiss him. In this, I
think we have been mistaken and that
the proper place to stand is the same
place occupied by so many others-on
the general issue of civil liberties and
the just limitations on the relational
authority of institutions. It was just
this principle, for instance, that President Lowell reflected in risking the loss
to Harvard of a ten-million-dollar bequest, which was threatened to be annulled unless an openly pro-German
professor was deprived of his chair.
What is so instructive of the episode is
that Lowell did not state his position
in terms of claiming that what the professor had done was an exercise of academic freedom. Indeed, had Lowell
done so, presumably he would then
have felt called upon to say a great deal
more, to justify the faculty member's
utterances as sufficiently restrained,
rigorous, and consistent with professional integrity, as not to call into
question his ability to continue at Harvard. Eschewing this approach, Lowell
declared instead:
If a universityor college censorswhat its
professorsmay say, if it restrains them
from uttering somethingit does not approve, it herebyassumesresponsibilityfor
that whichit permitsthem to say. This is
logicaland inevitable. If the universityis
right in restrainingits professors,it has a
duty to do so, and it is responsiblefor
whateverit permits. There is no middle
ground. Either the university assumes
full responsibilityfor permittingits professorsto expresscertainopinionsin public, or it assumes no responsibilitywhatever, and leaves them to be dealt with like
other citizens by the public authorities
accordingto the laws of the land.15
15. Recounted and discussed in R. Hofstadter and W. Metzger, The Development of
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It is perfectly clear that Lowell was
himself making an implicit distinction
between alleged abuses of academic
freedom-for which Harvard would
doubtless admit its responsibility of
review of its own faculty-and alleged
abuses of free speech and the general
issue of civil liberty. The distinction is
eminently correct and must not be
placed in jeopardy by what may now
be seen as the pyrrhic success of having
extended the claim of academic freedom
in a manner that invites more, rather
than less, institutional monitoring of
general civil liberties.
It is an altogether congenial development in our constitutional law that the
Supreme Court has come to essentially
the same conclusion in respect to the
general civil liberties of those who
teach: that at least where there is no
affectation of professional endeavor in
the aprofessional expressions of a faculty member-and no false trading upon
his institutional affiliation-there is
correspondingly no sufficient justification for the institution to presume to
review the conduct of the faculty member by the more taxing fiduciary standard of professional care. Thus, should
one be moved even casually to write a
letter to the editor expressing his sentiment on some political issue of the day,
it is entirely unjust for the institution
that employs him to call his professional integrity into question according
to that standard of carefulness and rigor
that may appropriately qualify his professional undertakings and the contingent special protection of academic
freedom. Indeed, to do so is in fact to
disadvantage him in his prerogatives as
a citizen, as the Supreme Court noted
in Pickering v. Board of Education:
What we do have before us is a case in
whicha teacherhad made erroneousstateAcademic Freedom in the United States (New
York: Columbia U.P., 1955).
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ments [in a public newspaper] upon issues
then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor
can be presumed to have in any way
either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the class-

roomor to have interferedwith the regular

operations of the schools generally. In
these circumstances we conclude that the
interest of the school administration in
limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the
general public.16

This "First Amendment" view of the
matter seems to me to be entirely sound
and desirably free from the false
freight of special accountability which
attached itself whenever we tried instead to justify the aprofessionalexpressions of faculty members as an act of
academic freedom, rather than as an
unexceptional claim to the equal protection of freedom of speech. As a
valid principle which is clearly to be
commendedas a reasonable standard of
self-restraint for all institutions of
higher learning, moreover, there is no
basis for us to hold it less applicable to
private institutions than to public ones.
THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF THE 1940
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

If there is any inhibition which currently restrains the AAUP from maintaining that the aprofessional activities
of faculty members are not subject to
institutional review by the same fiduciary responsibility for which they may
16. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). For more extended
analyses of Pickering, see O'Neil, "Public
Employment, Antiwar Protest, and Preinduction Review," U.C.L.A. Law Review 17
(1970), pp. 1028, 1040-53; W. Van Alstyne,
"The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and
Professors," Duke Law Journal (1970), pp.
841, 848-54.
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be asked to account through academic
due process in respect to their academic
freedom, it may be thought to arise
from the troubling ambiguity of the
following paragraph from the 1940
Statement of Principles:

The collegeor universityteacheris a citizen, a memberof a learnedprofession,and
an officer of an educational institution.
When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position
in the community imposes special obliga-

tions. As a man of learningand an educational officer,he shouldrememberthat the
public may judge his profession and his
institution by his utterances. Hence he
shouldat all times be accurate,should exercise appropriaterestraint, should show
respect for the opinion of others, and
should make every effort to indicate that
he is not an institutional spokesman.
(Emphasisadded.)17
If this paragraphwere taken as a statement of professional aspiration addressed to the good sense and esprit of
the academic fraternity, it might well
be thought to state a highly commendable view. If it is a statement which
means to encourage institutional review
-and possible dismissal-of faculty
members because aprofessional utterances may sometimes lack the degree
of accuracy and restraint not improperly expected of their professional endeavors, however, it is radically unfair
to the equal civil liberties of academics
and needs to be revised. As it happens,
neither of these alternatives quite describes the present situation.
A clarification was provided of the
critical "but" clause in 1963, in the
course of a Committee A review of a
case involving an assistant professor's
letter to the editor of a student newspaper published and distributed at the
17. Reprinted in AAUP Policy Documents
and Reports 2 (1971).

University of Illinois.18 The ad hoc
investigating committee of the AAUP
read the critical clause of the 1940
statement exclusively as an admonition
addressed to the professional conscience
of the faculty alone:
The ad hoc committeeis of the opinion
that . . . as appliedto a faculty member
having definite or indefinitetenure, making publicutteranceson mattersof general
concernto the community,the standardof
"academicresponsibility"is not a valid
basis for reprimand,dismissal, or other
officialdiscipline.19
Nevertheless, the plurality opinion for
Committee A disagreed. From its assessment of the legislative history of
the 1940 statement, it concluded that
the "but" clause was not a precatory
statement; rather, the clause was intended to recognize the legitimacy of
university authority to discipline faculty members for violating norms of
accuracy, self-restraint, and courtesy
even in respect to professionally unrelated extramural utterances:
In light of CommitteeA's understanding
of the 1940 Statement,together with the
legislativehistory of the documentand its
"interpretation,"the Committeedisagrees
with the authors of the report that "the
notion of academicresponsibility,when the
faculty memberis speakingas a citizen,is
intendedto be an admonitionrather than
a standard for the application of discipline.20
Left alone, this position would appear
to embrace the most self-effacing-and
simultaneously self-righteous-position
of all. The fact that Committee A
went on to stress the ameliorative influence of academic due process in such
cases-and to disapprove the particular dismissal of the faculty member as
18. See "Report on Academic Freedom and
Tenure: The University of Illinois," A.A.U.P.
Bulletin 49 (1963), pp. 25ff.
19. Ibid., p. 36.
20. Ibid., p. 41.

ACADEMIC

FREEDOM AND CIVIL

"outrageously severe and completely
unwarranted" under the circumstances
-does little to relieve one's objection
to the interpretation itself as a matter
of sound principle. On the one hand,
it appears to forswearany special claim
of academic freedom in respect to a
faculty member's personal prerogative
of general public discussion "when he
speaks or writes as a citizen," and not
under pretense or claim of professional
endeavor. At the same time, it appears
simultaneously to accept the legitimacy
of institutional restraint even in respect
to such ordinary political rhetoric by
the exceptionally inhibiting standards
of accuracy, care, restraint, and courtesy identified with the individual's professional status, that is, with his status
"as a man of learning and an educational officer." In this respect, the
trade-off the AAUP appeared to have
accepted with the Association of American Colleges in 1940-namely, to cultivate public confidence in the profession by laying down a professionally
taxing standard of institutional accountability for all utterances of a public
character made by a member of the
profession-is substantially more inhibiting of a faculty member's civil freedom of speech than any standard that
government is constitutionally privileged to impose in respect to the personal political or social utterances of
other kinds of public employees.
Immediately subsequent to its report
in 1963-but consistent with other portions of that report-however, Committee A adopted a more strict construction of the 1940 statement. This strict
construction disarms that statement to
a considerable extent and brings it, as
thus construed, much closer to the position the Supreme Court adopted on
First Amendmentgrounds in 1969:
The controlling principle is that a faculty
member's expression of opinion as a citizen
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cannot constitute grounds for dismissal
unless it clearly demonstratesthe faculty
member'sunfitness for his position. Extramuralutterancesrarely bear upon the
faculty member'sfitness for his position.
Moreover,a final decisionshouldtake into
accountthe faculty member'sentire record
as a teacherand scholar. In the absenceof
weightyevidenceof unfitness,the administration should not prefer charges;if it is
not clearlyprovedin the hearingthat the
faculty memberis unfit for his position,
the faculty committeeshouldmake a finding in favor of the faculty member concerned.21

Even conceding that this Committee A
construction may go nearly as far as
the AAUP can proceed in light of the
phrasing and legislative history of the
1940 statement, it remains subject to
criticism.22 One step that may easily
be taken is the more emphatic clarification of the standard of institutional review-assuming that such review is
ever called for, or at least that the 1940
statement, unless amended, provides for
the possibility-in cases where no claim
of academic freedom is asserted and no
willful trading upon professional status
has been involved in the personal activity of a faculty member whose institutional position is thereby drawn into
question by the character of the activity.
What needs to be done, however, is
21. Committee A Statement on Extramural
Utterances (1964), reprinted in AAUP Policy
Documents and Reports 14 (1971). See also
"Advisory Letter from the Washington Office,"
A.A.U.P. Bulletin 49 (1963), pp. 393, 394,
and the discussion in "Report on Academic
Freedom and Tenure: The University of
California at Los Angeles," A.A.U.P. Bulletin
57 (1971), pp. 382, 394-400, 404, 405.
22. See, for example, Remarks by President
J. W. Maucker of the University of Northern
Iowa (on the occasion of receiving the Tenth
Alexander Meiklejohn Award), A.A.U.P. Bulletin 54 (1968), pp. 251, 253-54; Schier, "Academic Freedom and Political Action," A.A.U.P.
Bulletin 53 (1967), p. 22.
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not merely to make clearer that a faculty member may not properly be held
to answer to an institution for the integrity of his general utterances by the
same standard by which he may have
to account for his academic freedom,
but to enlarge upon the implication of
our position that his substantive accountability for such utterances will
ordinarily not run to the institution at
all. For an alleged abuse of freedom of
speech, general provisions of law are
available to provide for measures of redress and sanction so far as it has been
thought both safe and just to allow. As
a consequence, society may not expect,
nor should the standards of the AAUP
contemplate, that recourse for alleged

abuses of ordinary civil liberty may be
compounded by the gratuitous use of
institutional disciplinary processes. It
may be conceded that circumstances
will sometimes arise where the personal
conduct of a faculty member may so
immediately involve the regular operation of the institution itself or otherwise
provide firm ground for an internal
grievance that internal recourse, consistent with academic due process, is
offensive neither to the general protection of civil liberty nor to the standards
of this Association. Decisions such as
that in the Pickering case are instructive, however, that this exception is not
nearly so broad as the presumption of
custom has supposed.

